A Middle Way to God is a book worth reading. Although I have reservations about some of Hallett’s conclusions, seldom have I read a book that was more informative and thought-provoking.
Even though we don’t have undeniable logical proof for belief in such things as physical bodies, the past and other minds, surely, Hallett begins, ‘these uncontested beliefs are legitimate and rational; surely they are true’ (p. 9). But what of belief in God? Are the reasons for believing in God as strong as those for affirming these uncontested beliefs? If so, then we have a sound basis for considering belief in God rational and true also.
By ‘God’ Hallett means the ‘God of Western tradition and of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim belief—creator and sustainer of the universe, supremely worthy of worship and obedience’ (p. 3). His understanding of truth is summarized in his ‘Principle of Relative Similarity’ (PRS): ‘A statement is true if, and only if, its use of terms resembles more closely the established uses of terms than would the substitution of any rival, incompatible expression’ (p. 14). Rational belief, for Hallett, does not require evidence that is either self-evident or derived or derivable from convincing premises. Rather, rational belief requires only that a person has epistemically good objective reasons (truth-related, objective evidence), whether propositional or nonpropositional, for believing what she believes.
To keep his comparative discussion focused Hallett considers just one uncontested belief: belief in other minds. And he chooses just one belief of this type: his belief that a mother he once saw look at her child tenderly really loved her child. So the actual question to be explored becomes the following: ‘How do belief in God, creator and sustainer of the universe, supremely worthy of worship and obedience, and the belief in the thoughts and feelings of other people (e.g., Mrs. M’s love) compare with respect to truth, as defined by PRS, and with respect to rationality, as defined by objective truth-related reasons for belief’ (p. 25)?
The first factor to be dealt with when considering this question, Hallett points out, is what he labels the Subjective Disparity Problem. ‘Whereas sane people doubt the existence of God, surely sane people do not doubt the existence of other minds with thoughts, feelings, and desires other than their own’ (p. 26). So the epistemic parity in question might from the start appear dubious to many.
But this seeming disparity is deceptive, we are told. There are many nonepistemic factors that influence belief (i.e., factors that don’t give us grounds for, or provide evidence for, the beliefs they influence), and these factors often appear to give more support to belief in other minds. For instance, many individuals today see the world through deterministic ‘cognitive spectacles’ and thus consider the question of God’s existence with a nonepistemic, but very real predisposition not to believe. However, when such nonepistemic factors are removed, Hallett maintains, epistemic parity between the two beliefs remains an open question to be determined by the objective evidence.
The first type of relevant evidence considered is our immediate experience. Do we have any reason to think that we have immediate access to other minds or God? Hallett does not deny that we can experience either directly, but denies that we can experience the full object of belief in either case (i.e., can experience God or another person entirely), so he feels an epistemic gap remains. What this means, he thinks, is that while direct experience may carry some weight, the exact weight ‘depends on a variety of factors, and especially on the likelihood that such an object exists and might so reveal itself’ (p. 65). So we need to consider what objective reasons can be given for belief in God and other minds.
The first such reason assessed by Hallett is the argument from analogy, the most popular current basis for belief in other minds. When we observe some action or behavior in others that is associated with some internal experience in us, we assume, by analogy, that they are also having the same type of internal experience (and thus that they are similar experiencing beings). For instance, since when we are stuck with a pin, we experience pain and find ourselves manifesting certain types of behavior (screaming, cursing, crying), we believe, by analogy that when others are stuck with pins, they also are experiencing pain, especially when they too manifest the types of behavior pain produces in us.
The main analogical argument for God’s existence runs a little differently: Just as when we receive what we have requested from a human we justifiably assume that the human to whom the request was made exists (even if never seen), when we receive from God that which is requested, we can justifiably assume that God exists (even if never seen).
It seems to many, Hallett acknowledges, that the analogical argument for other minds is the stronger of the two, but he is not convinced this is actually so. Rather, as he sees it, for those who have personally experienced seeming answers to prayer, the belief in God as giver may be just as strong as the belief in other minds, especially for those already inclined to believe that God does exist.
Hallett next considers what many see as the strongest argument for God’s existence: the teleological argument. Everything that exhibits adaptation of means to ends (e.g., the natural regularity, order and patterns we observe) and is such that we know whether it is the product of intelligent design is the product of intelligent design. The universe exhibits such adaptation of means to ends, and, therefore, the universe is probably the product of intelligent design.
Hallett himself finds this line of reasoning quite convincing, but admits that its strength depends in part on the degree of openness to theism a person possesses. For those open to belief in God, there is nothing else as plausible to explain intelligent life; for those open to belief in God, the unmistakable signs of God as Creator are evident in what we see in nature. But since for many the amount and extent of evil (pain, suffering, disorder) we experience counts against belief in God as creator and sustainer, any teleological argument for God’s existence, we are told, must address this fact. From Hallett’s perspective, evil is not nearly as much an epistemic problem as it is a psychological problem.
Specifically, he argues that because of our position vis-à-vis God, that is, because of our inability to understand the whole, ‘our failure to account for some evils does not weigh heavily in the scales of probability – not heavily enough to impugn the existence of God’ (p. 94). And this means that evil ‘does not significantly affect the epistemic merits of belief in God vis-à-vis belief in other minds’ (p. 102).
Finally, Hallett considers one other argument for other minds – the claim that this assumption is the best explanation for our observations – and notes a long list of additional arguments for God’s existence. But none of these, he concludes, establishes an epistemic disparity between belief in God and belief in other minds.
So where does all this leave us? The main question, remember, is how belief in God compares epistemically with belief in a mother’s love for her child. As Hallett sees it, ‘first a richer variety of evidence – mystical, analogical and teleological – supports belief in God. Second, the analogical evidence for God looks as strong as the analogical evidence for Mrs. M’s love …Third, the problem of evil does not shift the balance in favor of Mrs. M’s love’ (p. 121).
Of course, he acknowledges, not everyone shares the same evidence for God. For those for whom such evidence is first-hand (experiential), it will be much stronger. But while he acknowledges that not everyone will agree, it seems to him clearly to be the case that belief in God is epistemically comparable with belief in other minds. Thus, for him personally, since the latter belief is clearly rational and true, so, too, can belief in God be considered rational and true.
This epistemic support for belief in God’s existence, Hallett emphasizes in closing, falls short of the sort of rigorous scientific/logical defense sought by those such as Richard Swinburne. However, it is stronger that the purely defensive strategy employed by ‘Reformed Epistemologists’ such as Alvin Plantinga. Thus it is best viewed as a middle way to God.
As stated earlier, there is much to commend in this book. Hallet is a very good writer and has a fair, even-handed approach to issues. And his in-depth discussions of various concepts and arguments are impressive. For example, his analysis of the nature and role of analogy in our understanding of our world is the best I’ve seen to date. Also, his discussion of the importance of background beliefs (e.g., our social/cultural/ intellectual context, our personality) is extremely insightful and helpful. However, I find the claim that Hallet has given us a ‘middle way’ to think about the rationality of belief in God to be dubious.
Stated in my terms, what Hallett wants to offer as a middle way between strong positive apologetics (which requires evidence that cannot rationally be denied) and negative apologetics (which requires only that belief can be defended from irrefutable attack) is actually what might be labeled weak positive apologetics. Rational belief, he wants to argue, requires that we offer plausible objective reasons for belief (unlike what is required by the negative apologist), although such reasons need not be reasons that no rational person can reject (unlike what is required by the strong positive apologist).
I’m very sympathetic, in principle, to this understanding of rational belief, but fear that Hallett’s ‘middle way’ isn’t as objective (and thus isn’t as much in the middle) as he seems to believe. For instance, although he believes personally that the objective ‘analogical evidence for God looks as strong as the analogical evidence for Mrs. M’s love,’ he acknowledges that it is only for those who have had personal interventive experiences pointing to God that the analogical evidence for belief in God may be just as strong as it is for belief in other minds. And although he believes personally that teleological considerations offer stronger objective evidence for belief in God than for belief in other minds, he acknowledges that this will only be so for those who are already predisposed to theism and don’t see the nature and extent of evil to count strongly against God’s existence.
But, if this is so, then it seems to me that Hallet is admitting that the strength of his contention that there exists objective epistemic parity between the two beliefs in question depends almost entirely on nonepistemic factors—e.g., the experiences one has had, the social/cultural/religious context in which one was raised, the degree to which anti-theistic presuppositions strike one as plausible. Furthermore, I don’t see that he gives us any basis for claiming that those for whom the nonepistemic factors tilt the scales against belief in the epistemic parity of belief in God and belief in other minds are in any sense less justified in doing so. Accordingly, it seems to me that what Hallett offers us, in the last analysis, is just another way of saying that both of the following propositions are true:
And if I am correct on this point, then Hallet’s ‘way’ to God is much closer to a Plantingan negative apologetic (to the claim that one can justifiably hold a belief unless it can be shown on common grounds to be false) than it is to any form of strong positive apologetic (to the claim that one can justifiably hold a belief only if it can be demonstrated on common ground to be true).
However, the fact that I don’t think he has given us a new, middle way to consider theistic belief does not in my mind detract seriously from the value of this book. The value of this book, as I have said, lies in the creative, rigorous, even-handed manner in which Hallet discusses numerous concepts of importance to philosophers of religion or philosophical theologians. Therefore, I highly recommend Hallett’s work for those in either camp.