Marked by his usual clear and profound analysis, Stenmark’s newest book provides an excellent summary of and response to the challenges of contemporary forms of ‘Scientism’ to traditional understandings of ethics and religion. A brief introductory chapter sets out a preview of the whole argument of the book. The first two major chapters set the stage for his later evaluation by defining Scientism and its different uses, and by exploring the limits of knowledge and reality in light of scientifically reductionistic claims. The heart of the argument is found in Chapters 3 through 6, where Stenmark lucidly analyzes several popular attempts to provide scientific explanations of morality and religion, and carefully dissects the logical arguments of some key scientists whose projects involve debunking and/or replacing traditional ethics and religion with science. A final chapter offers some concluding remarks on ‘Scientism and the fear of religion.’

The first chapter addresses the question: ‘What is Scientism?’ Broadly speaking, it is the view that the scientific method has no (or few) limits and can successfully be applied to all (or virtually all) domains, thereby providing an explanation for everything (or everything knowable by humans). Scientism comes in different degrees, and the universal claims are Stenmark’s primary interest. Internal to the academy, ‘methodological’ Scientism is the attempt to extend the methods of natural science to other disciplines. Outside of the academy, the goals of Scientism are more comprehensive, and its forms more diverse. For example, Stenmark distinguishes between ‘epistemic’ Scientism (the only reality that we can know anything about is the one science has access to) and ‘ontological’ Scientism (the only reality that exists is the one science has access to). He also distinguishes between rationalistic, axiological and existential forms of Scientism, which in the case of some scientists (such as Carl Sagan, E. O. Wilson and Francis Crick) come together as ‘comprehensive’ Scientism (‘Science alone can and will eventually solve all, or almost all, of our genuine problems’).

Chapter 2 examines the issue of metaphysical and epistemological limits, exploring how these may affect the plausibility of the more radical forms of Scientism. For the sake of analysis, Stenmark suggests that we define an adherent of ‘Scientism’ as one who accepts at least one of the following four theses:

Beginning with T2, he observes that it is itself an extra-scientific claim, i.e., a philosophical assertion. It may or may not be true, but it should not be conflated with ‘science.’ Further, those scientists who assert it are in danger of self-referential incoherence, because the truth of T2 itself cannot be discovered by science. In reference to T1 (whose falsity would entail the falsity of T2), Stenmark offers several examples of kinds of knowledge that are not ‘scientific’ knowledge; e.g. observational and self-reflective knowledge, beliefs of memory, knowledge of linguistic meaning, and intentional knowledge. Ironically, each of these is required for ‘scientific’ knowledge. The first two theses of Scientism do not fare well; T2 is self-refuting and T1 is implausible. Further, Stenmark argues that those who assert them are making philosophical and ideological claims, not properly scientific ones.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine the challenges of Scientism to traditional ethics. Here Stenmark turns his attention to T3. He distinguishes three claims about evolutionary science: (A) it can explain the development and maintenance of morality in human life, (B) it can provide us with new information about human life and its environment that can undermine existing ethical theories, norms or beliefs, and (C) it can justify ethical norms or beliefs, thereby providing a new ethic. Stenmark is well aware of the important and significant breakthroughs in evolutionary biology, but his point is to show how these successes are surreptitiously used to buttress conclusions about ethics, conclusions that do not always follow logically and that lie outside of the range Of ‘science.’ He illustrates claim (A) in books such as E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology and Richard Dawkin’s The Selfish Gene, and builds on the work of other scientists (such as Holmes Rolston, III) in order to buttress his own argument that a full explanation of ethics requires non-Darwinian resources. Morality is indeed connected to general strategies for the production of offspring and survival, but much of the moral landscape cannot be reduced to strategies for maximizing fitness. Yes, evolution led to human cognitive resources that made scientific inquiry possible, but such resources also made possible inquiry into which courses of action are best (ethics). The latter cannot be wholly reduced to the former.

In Chapter 4 Stenmark examines the two other ways in which evolutionary theory may be brought to bear on ethical questions. He acknowledges that these sciences (and others) do provide new information and that ethicists must take them into account, but he challenges two claims made by ‘biological expansionists.’ First, the claim that morality is ultimately a matter of selfishness is based on a conceptual confusion, i.e., on a failure to distinguish clearly between the biological sense and the moral sense of the terms ‘selfishness’ and ‘altruism.’ This reductionism is grounded in the presupposition of T1 and T2, which he challenged in the second chapter. The second problematic claim often made by proponents of (B) is that the objectivity of morality is an illusion because it is a product of evolution. This Scientistic claim undermines itself since scientific assertions are also the product of evolution, and so do not have access to evidence that would determine the objectivity (or non-objectivity) of morality. Finally, project (C) is also found wanting, for Stenmark shows that Wilson (and others) cannot obtain an ought-conclusion from factual ‘is’ statements. To escape the naturalistic fallacy, one must introduce ought-premises into the argument, and these fall outside the proper scope of science.

Chapters 5 and 6 respond to forms of Scientism that attempt to debunk and/or replace traditional religion with reductive scientific explanations. Here Stenmark is responding to T4, which he calls ‘existential Scientism.’ Parallel to his treatment of ethics in previous chapters, he distinguishes three claims about the significance of evolutionary biological science for religion: (A) it can explain the development and maintenance of religion in human life, (B) it can provide new information that undermines (or supports) existing religious beliefs, and (C) it can replace traditional religions, providing humanity with a new religion or view of the meaning of existence. In Chapter 5 Stenmark focuses on project (A), and challenges the idea that the purely Darwinian account of religion is the best available. First, he notes that the claim of Scientism that traditional religion is not valid as a guide to life because it is a product of the brain’s evolution is self-referentially problematic, for science too is a product of evolution. He agrees that Darwinists can explain some religious behavior, but argues that one needs a non-Darwinian account to explain what he calls ‘existential concern.’ Religions include strategies to deal with this concern, and they sometimes result in behaviors that cannot be reduced to fitness-maximizing concerns. This is especially evident in religions that move from a tribal to a universal scope, producing ‘altruistic’ behavior in which existential flourishing is offered to those outside one’s immediate gene pool.

Chapter 6 turns to a treatment of the projects of (A) debunking and/or (B) replacing traditional religion with science. Many adherents of Scientism argue that science directly implies that traditional ideas of God, immortality and free will are false. Stenmark shows that these claims often presuppose the philosophy of scientific naturalism. He notes that religion itself may be seen as a mechanism for survival, insofar as it aims to make the world ‘existentially intelligible,’ while science aims to make the world ‘technologically or predictively intelligible.’ Only by assuming the truth of premises T1 and T2, which are philosophical and not biological assertions, may theological explanations be excluded. Stenmark observes that some scientists assume that religion is a scientific hypothesis. In some ways, a religious belief can function as a hypothesis, but usually not as a strictly ‘scientific’ hypothesis. Before Darwin, the ‘artifact designer theory’ was in fact a hypothesis that intended to explain the origin of life. Stenmark argues that this theory may be rejected without giving up the more basic religious belief that God is creator of the world; one might instead propose what he calls an ‘origin designer theory.’ His focus here is not to prove a particular religious hypothesis, but to suggest that in some cases these hypotheses are introduced to explain why science can explain things. Such discussions are philosophical, not scientific. Scientism cannot debunk all religious hypotheses without entering this arena of discourse and defending T1 or T2 as philosophical assertions. Stenmark follows a similar strategy in responding to the attempts of Scientism to debunk the idea of a divine purpose for the world (and human life especially) and to argue that the evil in the world disclosed by biology renders belief in a good Creator (more) implausible. In each case, scientists like Dawkins and Wilson are stepping over the bounds of science and unwittingly introducing extra-scientific (philosophical) premises into their arguments. Finally, Stenmark addresses the issue of the replacement of religion with science, responding to the pressure to become ‘science believers.’ The problem is that some authors have confused ‘scientific naturalism’ (which may be true but does not necessarily outlaw the existence of or knowledge of God) and ‘philosophical naturalism’ (an extra-scientific set of assumptions), which does not follow immediately from ‘science’ or from ‘methodological naturalism.’

The seventh and final chapter begins with a clear summary of the argument of the entire book. Stenmark then makes some poignant observations about the reasons for the emergence of Scientism. Science has indeed been marvelously successful in many ways, which explains much of the optimism among those who embrace Scientism. However, Stenmark also notes that another motive may be the desire to achieve ‘salvation’ through science. He observes a kind of ‘fear of religion’ among some authors, a strong hope that there is no God and that atheistic naturalism can in fact explain everything. Stenmark’s goal throughout the book has been to encourage readers to be more suspicious about what is claimed in the name of ‘science.’ He argues that religion has in fact proved more effective than science in making reality existentially intelligible, and concludes by calling for more philosophical exploration of ways in which the findings of evolutionary biological science may be acknowledged without giving up on the contributions of religion for understanding the meaning, value and purpose of human life.

Although the issues in this book are deep and complex, Stenmark’s treatment of them is at once concise and compelling. His book is well-organized and easy to follow, providing a clear and up-to-date assessment of the nature and influence of Scientism on scientists, philosophers, ethicists and general culture. I strongly recommend the book, which would serve well as a text for students, or as a reference for scholars whose work and lives are influenced by the challenges of Scientism.