The critique of religion presented in the wake of modernity took many different shapes. It is also worth noting that it was developed at the same time as philosophy of religion emerged as a discipline. This enabled different thinkers to criticize religious positions as well as the more general pattern on which these positions were based, in several ways. Philosophy of religion with a positive scope is still well advised to engage with those ways of articulating a critique of religion. Elisabeth Heinrich’s book presents us with a valuable contribution for this kind of work.

To put together three different thinkers in a book like this has a clear comparative outcome: it allows us to see traits in the history of ideas that condition the three persons and their positions which would otherwise have remained unrecognised. Although much is known about the origin and context of the critique of religion offered by Hume, Feuerbach and Nietzsche, Heinrich provides us with a detailed and clear picture that offers new insights into connections and differences, as well as material for further reflection.

The central thesis of the book is that the three philosophers in question have contributed strongly to the integration of the perspective of historical development in the critical reconstruction of religion. This perspective, most commonly called the genealogical, Heinrich claims that Hume is the first to flesh out in order to explain various aspects of Christianity. It also allows him to relate Christianity to other types of religion. In spite of the differences among the three thinkers, Heinrich finds in this genealogical approach a new and important perspective in the development of a critique of religion. If one were to suggest a more extensive discussion of these issues, one could call for a broader treatment of how the general genealogical approach also influences positions more favourable towards religion. Heinrich mentions Hegel, but one obvious predecessor would be Lessing.

The clarification of the genealogical approaches which Hume, Feuerbach and Nietzsche develop in itself is a valuable task, but Heinrich also wants to relate this approach more precisely to the more logically based refutation of religious positions. Among the arguments that run along this line are those which, on the basis of empirical definitions or the inherent contradictions of religious propositions, claim the lack of validity for such positions. Hence, the book offers a detailed account of how the logical and the genealogical critiques of religion are related in the works of Hume, Feuerbach and Nietzsche. Consequently, the contribution of Heinrich’s work lies more in the presentation and analysis of the material than in the critical discussion of the different positions. Nevertheless, the analysis is thorough and detailed as the author not only lays bare the structures of the thought of the three philosophers, but also enters into detailed accounts of how different elements of doctrine are criticized. She presents the authors in a fair way, not giving away too much of her own positions—although we get a glimpse of a more critical attitude now and then.

As the book is well informed about the present scholarly bulk of material relevant for the understanding of the philosophers in question, Heinrich’s book is one to which scholars working in this field are well advised to turn. Not only philosophers of religion, but also historians of ideas and theologians will benefit from reading it.