Does religious faith have an anthropological basis? This is the central question of the study on the basis of which the author received her Ph. D. degree at the Free University in Amsterdam. After introducing the question (chapter 1) she discusses two kinds of theories of religion in an attempt to find an answer: theories of a transcendental type (chapter 2) and theories that consider religious traditions as interpretations of reality (chapter 3). Representatives of the first kind are Karl Rahner, Gerhard Oberhammer and David Tracy. In relation to the second type she discusses John Hick, Garet Green and George Lindbeck. In a final chapter the author outlines her own views.

In the analysis of the various views the main question is divided into four subquestions. First: what is the relation between the content of faith and religious traditions on the one hand and the structural nature of being human and of religion on the other? Second: is it possible to develop a general theory of religion that obtains for all religious traditions in such a way that it is independent of one’s own background? Third: are there anthropological constants in human beings that can function as a link with religious faith? Fourth: how can the claim of absoluteness as part of a religious conviction be reconciled with the fact of the plurality of religions? (15)

The first question appears to be especially relevant in relation to the theories of religion of the transcendental kind. Especially in the case of Rahner it is made clear that a transcendental analysis of human nature in relation to the possibility of knowledge and religion leads to a view in which the idea of a universal a priori structure to a great extent determines the content of religion. More concretely, for Rahner the human person cannot be understood apart from her relation to God. Every religion somehow gives a symbolic expression to that. But something similar is the case with Oberhammer and Tracy, and even with John Hick. The problem the author sees with these views is that in this way it becomes difficult not to judge other religions from the standpoint of one’s own. This holds even more for the appreciation of a secular or non-religious view. Because Green does not look for a general structure in all religions but sees them as just different interpretations of reality he is able to escape this pitfall. To Lindbeck this does not apply because he makes his Christian view into an absolute norm.

It is clear that the second question is related to the first. It appears to be hard to develop a theory of religion that is not biased by one’s own basic conviction. Again, the theories that look at religious traditions as interpretations of reality are in a better condition than those of the transcendental type. In fact the first kind appears to look at religions from a higher level: it tends to point to general characteristics without determining in this way the content of a religious view. They rather concern typical questions that need an answer or basic experiences that ask for an interpretation.

In relation to the third question all the theories discussed have something to offer. Both approaches in one way or another relate religious conviction to human life in general. The transcendental approach relates religious conviction to characteristics of human nature and knowledge and tries to find in this way a basis for religion. Although the specific approach might not be acceptable because it determines the content of faith in a way that it excludes certain positions, it does refer to an anthropological basis. Theories that view religious convictions as interpretations of reality even more emphasize the relation between religion and general characteristics of human nature. Human beings by their very nature interpret reality, be it in a religious or in a secular way.

The final question appears to be a hard one again. According to Berendsen, only Green succeeds in combining a commitment to the truth of his own religion with a nonexclusive attitude towards other interpretations of reality, including secular ones. All other authors in one way or another take their own view as a starting point to assess the others. On the one hand Berendsen puts a lot of emphasis on the freedom people should have to make their own choice. To her, this implies that in terms of truth, in principle, any choice is legitimate. One conviction should not judge another. Not only the legitimacy of each claim to truth should be respected, the claim to truth itself should not be rejected. According to Berendsen, only in this way true dialogue is possible. At the same time Berendsen wants to do full justice to the fact that a religious interpretation of reality does claim truth for its own view.

In the final chapter Berendsen comes back to the four questions mentioned to sketch the contours of a theory of religion of her own. As to the relationship between structure and content she wants to avoid an approach in which the content of religion is determined by an a priori structure. For that reason she does not take her starting point in an ontological or epistemological analysis of human nature or knowledge but in anthropology, which for her means the concrete existence of people (157). In order to prevent that this starting point becomes trivial she connects it with the interpretative theories of religion (158f).

The same starting point is chosen in relation to the second question: how to develop a theory of religion that can claim universality, i.e. that does justice to every kind of religion. Berendsen realizes that in a theory of religion one’s own specific religious or secular conviction will have some impact (162). Yet the anthropological approach again seems to be most promising. It considers religious convictions as human interpretations of reality without assessing these interpretations from a specific viewpoint.

This point is elaborated upon in relation to the third question: the existence of anthropological constants in relation to religion. Specific issues in human existence like human finiteness, responsibility and failure, happiness and suffering, the moral good and evil ask for interpretation (167). This approach makes it possible both to see religion as based in human life and to have room for a non-religious view of reality. People may opt for a religious interpretation of reality but they may also choose a secular one, the difference being basically that they either experience a longing for the infinite and interpret reality from this ultimate perspective, or confine themselves to finite human experience (187, cf. 175f).

The last question about the combination of the basic equality of different religious or secular interpretations of reality on the one hand and the claim of truth of these interpretations on the other hand is solved by the idea of subjective truth. Truth can be claimed only within a specific interpretation so that it does not exclude the truth of another one. Religious convictions cannot claim a meta-level standpoint from which they can judge the position of others. Actually, Berendsen does introduce some criterium to assess the validity and acceptability of religious or secular convictions. This criterium is not intrinsic to religion, though. It is of an ethical nature. For this she refers to the golden rule: ‘do not do to others what you do not want others to do to you’, (cf. the Kantian categorical imperative) and to the ethical claim of the other which Levinas has emphasized (194f).

The basic structure of this study is clear, as I hope to have shown. Berendsen builds her argument consistently from an analysis of the different positions to an exposition of the view of her own. In general the discussion of the theories analyzed is clear, with the exception of the position of Lindbeck. E.g., it has not become clear to me how his general distinction between ontological, categorial and intra-systematic truth (142) is related to his specific idea of intra-textual truth in relation to the Bible, especially, because the intra-textual truth is interpreted as exclusive in relation to other views, while the analogy with intra-systematic truth would suggest otherwise. My main problem with this study lies somewhere else, though. I am not convinced by it, neither by the strength of its arguments nor by the outcome. I will work this out in relation to the four questions to which I referred above.

As to the relation between structure and content, I agree that the analysis of the structure of a basic conviction, religious or secular, needs to be applicable to all convictions concerned. But does this mean that the structural analysis may not include any normative element? This would imply that a basic conviction, religious or secular, by itself is not of a normative nature, but just a matter of fact. As Berendsen says, it is a conviction that brings order in the chaos of experiences and impressions. As such it has only an instrumental value. One should not worry about the truth of it. One can merely ask – although Berendsen does not ask that question herself – whether it works. Besides, it can be evaluated in an ethical way. However, this seems to be problematic because according to Berendsen ethical norms are themselves rooted in a religious (or secular?) basic conviction (194). The question is, though, whether this anthropological starting point itself does not imply a specific view of humankind, in fact one that is basically secular. Religion appears to be a human invention. Humankind is not created by God, but ‘god’ is created by the human community (173, 181f). The normative element in this view is that it leaves room to the human person to choose freely a basic conviction of her own. Berendsen applies a specific anthropology as a criterium for assessing transcendental, ontological or epistemological approaches, not anthropology as such. The suggestion that an anthropological approach is more open or neutral than a transcendental, ontological or epistemological approach is an illusion. The anthropological approach presupposes as much a given basic conviction as a starting point as the others. For that reason it also determines as much what should be understood by religion, be it on a meta-level. But then it is not clear why other approaches are criticized for doing the same.

This problem affects the second question about the universality of a theory of religion as well. In relation to this point Berendsen acknowledges the difficulty that any theory of religion will reflect the religious view of its proponent (162f). Yet her own position seems to be ambiguous. At the one hand, in her discussion of the transcendental theories of religion she criticizes them for not accepting other views on their own terms. But what about her own position? Will the view that God is a human creation be acceptable to those who believe in God as their creator? For Berendsen’s view of religion this is essential. Will this be universally accepted? On the other hand, Berendsen suggests that she herself is developing her theory from within the Christian religion (201). Yet, actually she takes Feuerbach’s and Nietzsche’s critique of religion as her starting point (181f). God is a projection and nothing more. The transcendent is only immanent in reality. The ‘other’ is only the other human being. Here too she follows Feuerbach, who in his later development considers the Ich-Du relationship and the state as the real absolute. Again, the anthropological starting point for the theory of religion appears to be a secular starting point instead of religion itself. But how could this be a better basis for a dialogue between religious convictions or between religious and secular views than the transcendental approaches that she rejects because of their ontological implications? Does the secular approach of the anthropological starting point not include an ‘ontology’ about God if He is seen as just a human creation?

A similar problem arises concerning the anthropological constants in relation to religion. The question how religion relates to everyday life is of course a relevant one. The idea of the similarity between religious and secular basic convictions seems to me to be fruitful. It makes it possible to relate the two to one another. But as an expression of the central question the search for anthropological constants in religion it seems to be ambiguous. Or rather, the search for an anthropological basis for religion itself appears to be ambiguous. On the one hand it asks for the relationship between religious views and the whole of human life. Or, in other words, for the structural place of any religion, including Christianity, in the overall reality of human existence. Or, in other words again, is there a structural element in human existence to which God’s revelation can connect? On the other hand, Berendsen seems to interpret the question for an anthropological basis for religion in such a way that anthropology as such can explain what religion is all about. The human person becomes the origin of meaning and order in the world. The anthropological basis of religion is interpreted in such a way that the human subject becomes the creator of God in stead of being created. Interpretation of reality is not basically an understanding of meaning and order that is ultimately given because this world has a divine Creator. Interpretation is understood as itself the origin of meaning and order. As far as the anthropological basis of religion is concerned the modern ‘turn to the subject’ appears to be crucial.

The problem of Berendsen’s view becomes most acute in relation to the fourth question: how to combine the truth claim of a religious conviction with the plurality of religious and secular views. The assumption is that no truth claim should be exclusive. The solution Berendsen proposes is a subjective concept of truth. It means that the truth claim of a religious conviction only applies to the adherents of that conviction. It is the commitment to a certain view that makes it true (169f, 175). In this way it seems one can be absolutely convinced of a certain conviction and at the same time give room to others to have their own convictions without challinging their truth claim.

To be honest, I have difficulties to take this seriously. First, because by making truth subjective, one seems to abandon the whole idea of truth. The argument that truth is relational is not sound. One can argue that knowledge is relational in the sense that our knowing is never complete or total. The knowledge we have is always limited to a specific context. But this does not mean that the truth of our knowledge for that reason depends on our commitment to it. The truth of knowledge does not arise because I choose for it. Truth holds and I either accept it or not. Without this the whole idea of truth looses its meaning. In other words, truth is a normative concept. To reduce the truth claim of religious convictions to those that adhere to it takes away the meaning of that truth claim. To say ‘God exists for me but maybe not for you’ gives a completely different meaning to the concept of God than is traditionally assumed.

Secondly, because Berendsen applies a very different truth claim to her own basic conviction that religion is an invention of humankind, and God a creation of people. It is only on the basis of this assumption that it makes sense to say that the religious claim to truth should be limited to its adherents. But this means not only that the truth claim of a religious conviction looses its meaning but also that Berendsen herself implies a very different truth claim to her own basic conviction, which appears to be not Christian but postmodern secular.

The problem can be illustrated in terms of the possibility of true dialogue. The intention of Berendsen’s theory of religion is to make possible open dialogue between different religious convictions and between religious and secular views. In her opinion this can only be done if no conviction claims exclusivity. The first problem with this is that a religious conviction which does not accept the idea of subjective truth, e.g. one that claims that God really exists and that at some point every knee will bow for Him (eschatological verification), is a priori excluded from the dialogue because it does not accept the terms on which Berendsen thinks dialogue is possible. The second problem is that Berendsen suggests that she as a Christian is committed to a specific religious tradition and at the same time open to the truth of others. However, she actually builds the possibility of interreligious dialogue on her own, secular, basic assumption. A third problem is that it is not clear anymore why people should get involved in an interreligious dialogue if the truth claims of all religions are merely subjective. Then, the only reason for dialogue which remains is that another religion might have some elements that I would like to include in my own, not because I believe it is true, but just because I like it as an element to order the chaos of my experience of reality. That is consistent with the idea that people have a religious conviction because they want to, because they feel a certain need (203), and because the ordering of the chaos of experience is something good (204). Religion in this way seems to become a commodity that people either choose or not, whatever they feel like. In this way, religious convictions become part of the consumer mentality of our so-called postmodern western world. From this perspective it is only fortunate that the criterium Berendsen applies to the acceptability of a religous view is not religious itself but ethical.