The Ashgate Philosophy of Religion Series is a new series of this reputed publisher that provides a platform for the renewed interest in the area of philosophy of religion. The series comprises five published and forthcoming titles by Jerome Gellman (Mystical Experience of God, 2001), David Basinger (Religious Diversity, 2002), Joshua L. Golding (Rationality and Religious Theism, forthcoming 2003), Peter Byrne (God and Realism, forthcoming 2003) and Garrett J. DeWeese (God and the Nature of Time, forthcoming 2004).
David Basinger is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics and currently chair of the Division of Religion and Humanities at the Roberts Wesleyan College, a liberal arts college with a stated Christian worldview in New York (USA) where he has taught for over twenty years. In Religious Diversity Basinger poses the question: what is an epistemologically justifiable response to the reality of religious diversity? Traditionally two answers have been given to this question: religious pluralism and religious exclusivism. Basinger’s answer is a philosophical defence of the latter.
For Basinger the problem of religious diversity presents itself when significant differences of opinion on religious matters arise between equally knowledgeable and sincere individuals—he also calls it religious epistemic peer conflict. What is the proper epistemic response where different religious viewpoints are held to represent the truth? In addition to religious relativism (that truth itself is relative and plural), which Basinger does not discuss, there are essentially two answers: (1) religious universalism, i.e. that all the major religious traditions (or basic theistic systems) provide different but equal access to the same ultimate religious reality; and (2) religious exclusivism, i.e. that only one basic theistic system contains the truth, while the others are mistaken, or at least further from the truth. The distinction between these two positions becomes flexible, though, when variants of either are considered, for example hard pluralism, soft pluralism, hard exclusivism and soft exclusivism (inclusivism).
Nonetheless, Basinger maintains that religious exclusivism is a justified position to hold as long as the quest for truth is acknowledged as a basic epistemic duty. He formulates this duty as follows: ‘If a religious exclusivist wants to maximise truth and avoid error, she is under a prima facie obligation to attempt to resolve significant epistemic peer conflict’ (p. 11 – also labelled ‘Basinger’s Rule’). Religious universalism avoids such attempts by dismissing religious differences as inconsequential since they are all equally true. This, for Basinger, hampers the pursuit of truth.
Religious exclusivism becomes even more feasible, he says, when one considers intra-theistic diversity, that is, significant differences within basic theistic systems rather than between basic theistic systems. For instance, the disagreements between Christians on the nature of God’s omnipotence and consequently on the nature of human freedom (an example that Basinger cites frequently), poses a real difference with important implications for the individuals and the doctrines involved. Such religious diversity calls for assessment and at least an attempt at resolution. If this holds for intra-systemic diversity, it also holds for inter-systemic diversity—in short for all forms of religious epistemic peer conflict.
Basinger provides a thorough discussion of various criticisms that may be voiced against his position. After introducing his position, he considers in chapter two (against those who propose a more extreme exclusivist position) why the religious exclusivist faces an epistemic obligation to assess his or her current perspectives in the face of diversity. Alvin Plantinga argues that exclusivists may dismiss religious differences as long as it cannot be demonstrated that their beliefs are very likely false (because, he argues, as long as this cannot be proven, proponents of adverse beliefs need not be considered on an equal epistemic footing). Basinger dismisses this on the evidence of intra-systemic conflict: when exclusivists face intra-system peer conflict, they mostly attempt to resolve the differences.
Jerome Gellman also challenges Basinger’s position on account of ‘rock bottom beliefs’ – those basic foundational truths that underlie the exclusivist’s epistemic system – which, he claims, need never be assessed. Basinger argues, however, that even the most fundamental beliefs may change over time and within contexts: there is no such thing as timeless, unchanging beliefs. And since ‘rock bottom beliefs’ are so consequential in belief systems, the religious exclusivist, who desires truth, have all the more reason to submit such beliefs to regular assessment. Basinger acknowledges that neither of his arguments against Plantinga and Gellman proves his conviction that the religious exclusivist has an epistemic obligation to assess his or her beliefs, but at least they show that there are good reasons to do so.
Chapter three assesses the current philosophical debate about religious exclusivism. The question Basinger seeks to answer is whether the religious exclusivist has any justified right, in the face of unresolved peer conflict, to maintain that his or her position is closer to the truth than competing claims. J.L. Schellenberg holds that you may hold your perspective to be true only when you can offer non-question-begging justification that competing claims are false. However, he says, the nature of religious diversity is such that no believer can offer such objective justification and therefore no position can claim to be true. William Wainwright argues for a similar, albeit less extreme position by distinguishing between pragmatic and epistemic rationality. While exclusivists have no epistemic grounds to maintain their exclusivist position, they may at least have reasonable pragmatic grounds to do so. Basinger argues that while these perspectives cannot be falsified, the kind of strong rationalism that they propose has come under increasing opposition in contemporary philosophical debate and that this weakens their arguments.
William Alston’s position lies at the other end of the spectrum. He agrees that there is no recognised set of objective criteria or common ground by which to settle religious epistemic peer conflict, but for him the most sensible response to this shortfall is for the religious exclusivist to ‘sit tight’ with the belief system that has thus far served well. Philip Quinn offers a more modest version of this position by distinguishing between a pre-Kantian and a Kantian understanding of truth. A Kantian approach to religious belief acknowledges that we have no direct access to the noumenal or to the ultimate reality. We always interpret it from our socio-cultural contexts. The exclusivist, he says, is required to develop ‘thinner theologies’ that modify his or her phenomenological understanding of divine reality in an attempt to reconcile it to the phenomenological understandings of others. Only after this can the exclusivist justifiably ‘sit tight’ with his or her remaining beliefs – beliefs that will be less restrictive and more general. Basinger places himself alongside Quinn, arguing that the sort of belief assessment that he has in mind is exactly what Quinn pleads for.
In the fourth chapter Basinger considers religious universalism by providing an overview of John Hick’s position. Basinger, however, maintains that the evidential basis of Hick’s argument – namely the phenomenological facts that (1) there is a high rate of correspondence between place of birth and religion, (2) all religions propose a transformation from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness and (3) religion is influenced by culture and there is a growing awareness of cultural diversity—provides no conclusive proof that exclusivism is unjustifiable. They do, however, give the exclusivist good reason to engage in belief assessment. If such assessment demonstrates that held perspectives do not contradict any background beliefs in which they are embedded (with reference to Alvin Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Epistemology’), an exclusivist position may be maintained. And even if exclusivism is rejected, says Basinger, Hick does not provide sufficient reason to embrace universalism.
In the remaining chapters Basinger demonstrates the applicability of his position in the light of a number of characteristic subjects related to religious diversity. The first (chapter 5) is on the popular topic of the afterlife. He discusses a number of traditional exclusivist positions in order to demonstrate why they may be defended in the light of Basinger’s Rule.
The second (chapter 6) is on the justifiability of positive apologetics. Two forms of positive apologetics may be identified: personal positive apologetics (to identify for oneself sufficient reasons for continued belief) and proselytising positive apologetics (the attempt to convert others to one’s perspective). According to Basinger’s Rule, the obligation for belief assessment in the attempt to maximise truth necessitates personal positive apologetics. Proselytising positive apologetics, however justifiable (especially when required by the basic theistic system), cannot be argued to be an obligation in terms of Basinger’s Rule.
In the final chapter on diversity and teaching, Basinger argues that neutralism is the only appropriate approach for a teacher or lecturer in the classroom setting. This is not only for ethical reasons (the students are not the teacher’s peers and accordingly must not be influenced from a position of authority), but also for pedagogical reasons (students will thus best develop the tools by which to assess their own beliefs).
Basinger’s book provides a comprehensive overview and justification of religious exclusivism. The prima facie obligation to attempt to resolve epistemic peer conflict tempers the traditional image of the exclusivist as an arrogant, insensitive proselytiser. Rather, exclusivists in Basinger’s view wish precisely to maximise truth and avoid error. They are discussants in the ongoing search for truth and here the perspective of Quinn is, as Basinger admits, very useful.
Since the nature of truth plays such a central role in this position, the book would have gained greatly from a more comprehensive discussion of truth. Basinger frequently remarks in passing on the nature of truth, but a distinct discussion would have contributed to a better understanding of the problem of religious diversity. In this regard a Gadamerean perspective of truth and hermeneutics (which seems to relate closely to Basinger’s position) could also be beneficial.
The discussion on the eternal destiny of humankind would probably have benefited from a third traditional approach to salvation, namely universalism (that all people will eventually be reconciled to God). According to Basinger’s Rule, universalism may very well also be defended as a viable exclusivist position. This would also further clarify the meaning of exclusivism over and against pluralism. Exclusivism, namely, does not primarily hold that only one’s own position is true; it primarily holds that there is only one way to the truth and that our responsibility is to search for that way—a distinction that Basinger repeatedly emphasises.
This book provides a well-constructed defence for the exclusivist position and will be suitable for upper-level undergraduate courses in both philosophy and theology. Since the chapters do not follow a strict argument, they may also be read selectively. It provides a clear and concise overview of proponents and opponents of exclusivism and is therefore also very valuable for any graduate or further research on religious diversity. Teachers and lecturers will also find Basinger’s defence of neutralism of great value for their classes.