^[1] Editing a book on difference in philosophy of religion shows ambition. It shows the author’s openness and willingness to leave well-trodden paths of thought. It can also count as an attempt to show that the internal discussions within the philosophy of religion connect to that within society as a whole. Both our global society and the community of philosophers of religion appear to struggle with fundamental questions on how to cope with differences and the concept of diversity, especially in connection with religion. In his Introduction, Goodchild claims: ‘Yet what remains truly extraordinary is the extent to which it is ignored in modern life, for while its issues are of interest to many, few pay attention to its experts’ (p.1). It is this personal observation that opens up a wide variety of questions concerning the basic beliefs to which we as humans, and as scientists, cling with such fortitude of conviction and argument that we trick ourselves in believing they are not at all to be disputed but taken to be true, real, facts. Goodchild poses the following question to himself, and to the academic community of philosophers of religion: ‘For when it comes to the most fundamental questions of religion, it would seem that everyone is their own authority and can decide for themselves-as though the decades of patient, open-minded searching and questioning by gifted specialists were worth nothing, as though any possible genuine insight into religious matters could only be communicated through preaching or example, but not through argument.’ (p.1)

^[2] In emphasizing the discerning capacity of logical argument Goodchild sets the stage for an exercise in reflective practice by philosophers of religion themselves and the academic community as a whole. For philosophy of religion to reach a wider audience – a rather ambitious goal for a specialized academic community, but in itself testifying to an awareness of the potentially healing contribution that philosophy of religion might make to contemporary society – those engaged in it have to be ready to question their own positions and practices. In doing that, they should take account of the broad variety and seemingly unending range of differences of opinion, argument and beliefs within their own community, and within themselves. What should be the decisive factor in dealing with these differences? The need for this exercise finds its ground in Goodchild’s own insight into human existence: ‘The suspicion may develop that arguments in the philosophy of religion are “justifications” of highly localized and particular religious opinions – “justifications” which masquerade as public and universal judgments of what is the case, and thus attempt to entrap the interlocutors into abandoning their own local and different perspectives, so as to accede to the judgments of the master thinker’ (p.2). So this is also about relations of power and the particular forms these adopt in this academic field. This is important because relations of power can obscure the more fragile level of meaning connected with the study of religion.

^[3] Goodchild invites the reader, as he did the contributors to this volume, to shed the blinders from our eyes and to open ourselves and our particular positions up to the possibility of a different view, a different appreciation of what it is to be a religious thinker, or a thinker about religion. Not in order to let our own views and beliefs to be taken over or undermined by others, but to peel off the falsehood of factuality. The inherent value of a particular, localized view or belief is only to shine through more, when the veil of the necessity of universalism is lifted. And, if there are universal aspects to be found, they will show themselves to be universal, especially in a light that focuses on difference.

^[4] The tool Goodchild recommends philosophy of religion to employ in this self-reflective practice is critical theory. Believing strongly in the power of reason, Goodchild advocates ‘drawing the discourse of critical theory into philosophy of religion itself’ (p.5). Critical theory opens up the world of ideas and convictions to scrutiny while at the same time introducing difference and diversity as inviting, appealing and sometimes even justly provocative aspects of the philosophy of religion. Even more fundamentally, Goodchild argues for a new ontology based on giving attention to a common experience of exteriority. For that is, according to Goodchild, what meeting with difference and diversity is.

^[5] The book is divided in five parts, all serving the above-mentioned goal of introducing critical theory into philosophy of religion. The first part, simply called ‘Philosophy of Religion’ focuses on the field as a whole and asks questions concerning conceptual differences and the separation of thought and existence prior to verification. Brayton Polka takes this directly to a fundamental level when he focuses on Anselm’s ontological argument to show the necessary relationship between thought and existence. ‘I shall thus argue for the position that, in order for thought to be self critical, in our age as in any prior age, it must remain faithful to the insight that nothing – religious or philosophical – can be thought outside the ontological argument for existence.’ Leaning heavily on Hegelian dialectic Polka argues: thought and existence; two yet one. In chapter 2, Avron Kulak develops a truly hermeneutic argument for the position that human endeavors to interpret divine texts like the bible are the perennial source of critical thought. This inherent dualism between divine and human signatures is the basic constitution of critical theory. Dealings with differences and diversity are by their very presence truly contemporary and inescapable. The third author in this first part of the book, Mark Cauchi, applies critical thought to the concept of the indefinite. Rather then talking about critical theory, Cauchi vehemently criticizes the often intuitive conception of the indefinite on rational and historical grounds. This exercise in analytical philosophy seems at first sight to be an exemplary exercise in critical theory as well. On closer scrutiny, however, it reveals itself as being closed-minded, for by building an argument mainly by using other people’s thoughts as building blocks, the author deprives himself of awareness of the contextuality of these arguments, even if the net result yields some original new insights.

^[6] The second part of the book deals with ‘Sexual Difference’, a widely debated and in a growing number of academic fields in the humanities subversive line of thought. This is one of the most prominent and well-developed examples of critical thought. Ellen Armour succeeds in criticizing the masculine subject in religion and, with Irigaray, Hollywood, Freud and Derrida, opens up possibilities for religion after ontotheology. Amy Hollywood herself takes feminist philosophy even further by focussing her attention not merely on the discursive but on the place of ritual and practice in religion. For feminist philosophy of religion is aimed less on the justification of belief, and more on ‘becoming divine’ (p.74). This is an excellent example of critical theory within the boundaries of philosophy of religion. Fruitful in the sense that it does more than bridge the gap between Anglo-American philosophy and continental philosophy, it connects – even more importantly – bodily, spiritual and intellectual aspects of the experience of religion. The admission of difference and diversity into the ranks of religion itself seems to broaden and deepen the human experience and exploration of religion.

^[7] The third part of the book deals with ‘Locating Difference in Traditions’ and is dominated by questions of post-colonialism in relation to religious practices. Arvind-Pal S. Mandair brings this question of post-colonialism back to its bare essentials and asks: ‘What if Religio remained untranslatable?’(p.90). Trying to come to terms with the impossibility to erase the effects of colonialism on indigenous religious worlds and belief-systems, Arvind–Pal S.Mandair and Navdeep Singh Mandair formulate possible ways to incorporate difference into the philosophy of religion, taking into account the inequality in power relations involved in the domination process of one religious tradition over another. That this project, till this day, remains no easy task is well articulated. ‘The aim of what follows is not simply to construct a different history of ideas but to diagnose this history in its mode of construction as the history of a repression whose effects continue to be felt today in the efforts by post-colonials to negotiate cultural difference in the academic study of religion’ (p.89). Paulo Gonalves adds to this very powerful part of the book by explicating the effects of abstract and totalizing models such as ‘religious worlds’ to represent the identity of religious traditions’(p.131). He goes on to say that ‘they serve the interests of specific elites and “orthodoxies” within traditions, to the detriment of less influential, though potentially more widespread variations. He addresses the need for and justification of the empowerment and democratization of philosophy of religion. He argues for an open, polyphonic approach and practice in theology and religious studies. This opens the door for true empowerment. Youssef Yacoubi shows that not only Christianity, but also Islam could benefit from critical theory. In addition, to add to the call for more openness in religious studies, he opens the door to cooperation between academic disciplines in order to create an ‘applied Islamology.’

^[8] In the fourth part of the book, Paul Fletcher and Jim Urpeth shift focus to ‘Locating Experience in Culture’ and highlight the influence of Western capitalism on religion and the sacred. Their emphasis on experience seems to be an attempt to explore a different perspective on the role of the religious and the transcendent in human existence. They take as it were, one step back, sigh and write down their views on what it looks like from afar, to be a human being in this day and age, in this Western capitalist part of the world. Engaged in social critical theory, Paul Fletcher and Jim Urpeth show that a change of perspective allows for much new insight into the field of philosophy of religion and related fields. Their effort has a gentle but non-negligable capacity to inspire the reader to change perspective.

^[9] Concluding the book, in ‘Political Difference’, Goodchild writes an essay on exteriority. His central question is ‘What should happen when religious people meet?’ Even though religious traditions might offer several or no particular ways to deal with such an encounter, Goodchild emphasizes the personal responsibility of every individual to select the most appropriate response for oneself. He argues for a ‘meeting space’ in between different religious traditions. ‘In distracted attention, we might participate in a common space of encounter, without undermining or reducing any degrees of difference.’ (p.199) And what seemed to be an essay on difference in philosophy of religion turns out to be an encouragement to the global human society to unite in the face of coming natural disaster. The current alarming data on the Earth’s climatological future give Goodchild a first reason to state: ‘Whether or not religion originated from fear of the forces of nature, it will have to respond to them‘(p.200). Secondly, market capitalism and thirdly the experience of suffering. When people share experiences of poverty and suffering, these unite them. ‘We all dwell in an exterior site now, but we dwell there together’ (p.202). Goodchild links this communal experience to a political agenda saying: ‘How will we spend this time together? What shall we speak of? This is the fundamental political problem of dialogue and difference’(p.202).

^[10] Having read the whole book I am left with a wide variety of new insights into the philosophy of religion. In reference to the outline of the book as described in the Introduction by its editor Philip Goodchild, I find he has succeeded in bringing together examples of difference as an illustration of the clear need to talk and think about difference in philosophy of religion. It seems to me, though, that it is primarily Goodchild himself who is aware of the meta-perspective according to which difference in philosophy of religion is a topic in need of attention. In spite of the quality of their contributions and the diversity of their backgrounds and research fields, the authors do not betray much commitment to this overall purpose of the book. This, of course, does not mean that their contributions are not valuable. The lack of coherence within this volume, however, suggests a lack of experience within the philosophy of religion in dealing with difference within its own ranks. The very specialized contributors clearly show how their work is different from the work of others in their field. But they appear unaware of the need for incorporating difference within the academic practice of ‘mainstream’ philosophy of religion. In addition, the clearly expressed need for recognition of the trials and tribulations of post-colonial societies and their mutilated indigenous religious traditions seems to suggest that the time of their true emancipation and empowerment is still to come. Much work is still to be done as part of a large scale awareness-raising project that spans over an area well beyond the philosophy of religion, mainly into politics. It is in this sense that Goodchild rightly appreciates the broader scope of the project at hand. It might well be, however, that the academic context of the philosophy of religion is not the most effective forum for initiating the changes asked for in this book. This does not alleviate the responsibility of philosophers of religion as professional thinkers and experts to address difference in the field with attention and dedication. But a serious acknowledgment of the issues raised in this book will almost certainly call for a shift of power within the community itself. Unless this task is completed, the philosophy of religion will not be able to share its fruitful insights with the rest of society. And that would be a loss, for the issues at stake within philosophy of religion are important enough to deserve a wider audience.