[1] Eschatology has been receiving renewed attention from Christian philosophers as a natural development of the revival of interest in philosophy of religion. The discussion has moved beyond issues related to generic theism and now engages distinctively Christian claims and doctrines, matters previously left to systematic theologians. Interest in hell and universalism is closely connected to some of the most central of Christian doctrines, in particular, the doctrine of salvation. Traditionally, most Christian theologians have rejected the idea of universal salvation. That is, they have held that some will be eternally damned, separated forever from the love of God and left to the misery of their sins.
[2] The doctrine of eternal hell so understood is of interest to philosophers because of its connection to another large issue, namely, the problem of evil. Indeed, the doctrine of eternal hell is arguably the most severe aspect of the problem of evil, since by definition it is evil that is never redeemed. Consequently, those engaged in the project of theodicy have had to account for the doctrine of hell in their efforts to defend the perfect goodness of God in the face of evil. This has typically taken the form of trying to show that eternal hell is not in fact incompatible with God’s perfect character and can be defended against moral objections that commonly arise. In current philosophical literature, a number of writers have appealed to libertarian freedom to make moral sense of the doctrine. In particular, it is argued that we have the freedom to reject God’s love so the misery of hell is the natural consequence of being separated from him. God does not send people to hell on this account, but he will not override the freedom of those who choose to be separated from him.
[3] More recently a number of philosophers and theologians have been advancing a different solution to this problem. In short, they deny that hell is eternal and affirm that all will be saved. Thus, in the end there will be no unredeemed evil.
[4] The author of this book lends support to the growing trend toward universalism. Not insignificantly, the subtitle of the book is ‘Are We Free to Reject God?’ As Hall recognizes, how one understands the nature of freedom will have crucial consequences for how one conceives of hell. Not surprisingly, as we shall see, Hall rejects a libertarian understanding of freedom.
[5] As the title of the book indicates, Hall discusses these issues by examining the works of two major figures in contemporary philosophy of religion, namely, Richard Swinburne and John Hick. Although hell has not been a major emphasis in his work, Swinburne has defended a version of the doctrine in connection with his larger project in philosophical theology. Hick, by contrast, has devoted considerable attention to a defense of universalism over the years. The bulk of Hall’s book is devoted to first expounding and then criticizing the views of these authors on these respective subjects.
[6] Swinburne’s defense of hell depends heavily on his commitment to a strong view of libertarian freedom. On his view, God gives us the freedom to form our character either for good or for evil. Once our character is formed, we no longer have the ability to make certain kinds of choices. If a person forms his character for evil, God will not override his freely chosen character, and he can no longer be saved. At this point Hall contends, there is little difference between the compatibilist and the libertarian positions for both maintain that character determines choice. ‘Thus the inner freedom required by the libertarian can only be initial freedom to form character, and this is not substantially different from the freedom required by the compatibilist’ (p 93).
[7] When Hall turns to Hick, he stipulates that he will focus only on Hick’s writings up to 1983. The reason for this is that Hick’s later writings are increasingly agnostic to the point that they even deny the premises of his earlier argument for universalism. In short, his later agnosticism is at odds with his universalism. But even within the scope of his earlier writings, Hall finds much to criticize. He points out that Hick wavers between contingent and necessary universalism. The former holds that in the actual world all persons will in fact finally be saved, although it possible that some could be lost, while the latter view maintains that it is not even possible that some will be lost.
[8] Moreover, Hall points out that Hick needs a stronger view of divine foreknowledge than he affirms to be confident of his universalism. As his position stands, all that Hick can be sure of is that none will go to eternal hell, but he cannot rule out the possibility that some may forever remain in a sort of perpetual purgatory and never make a decisive choice for God. Hick’s position rests crucially on his view that all persons have a predilection for God, but he leaves open the possibility that some may never respond positively to God’s love and grace.
[9] In the final chapter, Hall proposes a defense of universalism that aims to avoid the deficiencies in Hick’s view. He rejects both what he calls hard universalism, the view that God will override freedom if necessary to save all persons, as well as necessary universalism. In place of these, Hall proposes what he calls firm universalism, the view that God will insure through middle knowledge that all persons will in fact respond positively to his love and grace. However, Hall’s defense of universalism does not depend only on an appeal to middle knowledge. He also holds that all persons will have a face to face encounter with God after death in which they will for the first time see God as he really is. In this encounter all will recognize that they do indeed have a deep yearning for God. Hall’s view then, in short, is that all persons have a predilection for God and that all will come to realize this and act on it after death if not before. In this life, Hall agrees with Hick that we are at an epistemic distance from God and freely develop our own wills. But God can through his middle knowledge know that all persons would freely respond positively to him in a face to face encounter, and he can arrange things so all persons have this experience and respond in this fashion.
[10] Hall’s defense of universalism is an interesting attempt to deploy various distinct concepts and lines of thought in a creative synthesis that renders it rationally certain that all will finally be saved, without denying the reality of human freedom. My questions about his case mostly revolve around his account of human freedom.
[11] Although Hall affirms a compatibilist or soft determinist view of freedom, his account of this has a distinctly libertarian flavor. He writes that ‘soft determinists simply assert that there is a reason why we make particular decisions’ (p. 182). This is striking because those who affirm a libertarian view of freedom often argue that reasons explain our actions but do not determine them. Reasons may incline one to act in a certain way, but other reasons may also be present that incline one to act in another way. One could choose either way, and reasons would be present to explain either action. So long as reasons only incline but do not determine, it is not clear that one is affirming a compatibilist view. The same point could be made about the idea that we are created with a predilection for God. So long as this predilection does not determine that we will inevitably choose God, it is not sufficient to underwrite a compatibilist view of freedom.
[12] Since Hall stops short of saying that reasons and inclinations determine our actions, it is doubtful that his view is really a compatibilist one.
[13] A similar ambiguity is evident in the fact that Hall appeals to middle knowledge to assure his universalism. If our God given nature determines that we will inevitably choose God either in this life or in an after death encounter which will make clear our yearning for him, then middle knowledge is unnecessary to assure universalism.
[14] Middle knowledge, according to Molina, pertains to free choices that God does not determine. If this is so, then it is possible that there are persons that would never respond positively to God in any circumstances he might create. Hall attempts to circumvent this problem as follows: ‘Although the truth of counterfactuals of freedom are not controlled by God, it is not the case that God is simply left to make the best of what he finds. It is after all, God who makes human as they are’ (p. 218). But here is the question. Are the persons God knows about through middle knowledge free in such a way that they could reject him, as Molina believed? If so, then middle knowledge pertains to the choices they actually would make in various circumstances and states of affairs, although they could in fact choose other than they do.
[15] Now Hall seems to be suggesting that God, in making humans as he does, makes them in such a way that they will inevitably choose God. Perhaps they can resist him for an indefinite period of time, but in the end must admit their yearning for him and be united with him. In that case, middle knowledge would not be needed to know that all will be saved. Middle knowledge might be helpful in knowing just when and under what circumstances people would finally respond positively to God. But it would not be needed to underwrite the basic claim that all will certainly do so at the end of the day.
[16] Moreover, it might be possible to defend a version of firm universalism by appealing to middle knowledge while assuming a strongly libertarian view of freedom. This version would hold that God’s perfect goodness requires universalism, so God would not create us with libertarian freedom unless he knew through middle knowledge that he could so arrange the world that all would eventually freely accept his offer of love.
[17] In short, there are ways to defend certain universalism using only middle knowledge and there are ways that employ only soft determinism (both assuming of course certain claims about what perfect goodness requires). But Hall’s effort to deploy both of these indicates an ambiguous commitment to each of them.
[18] Still, this is a significant discussion of crucial issues that moves the discussion in some new directions. It provides an informative and critical review not only of Swinburne and Hick but also an insightful assessment of several other writers who have recently addressed the topics of hell and universalism.