^[1] Helm and Crisp correctly observe that, in the past couple of decades, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) has been the subject of a ‘burgeoning industry’ (ix). Theologians, historians, philosophers, literary critics, pastors, educators, and scholars in other disciplines have mined his work for insights into his time and to draw applications for today and the future. This eighteenth century New England pastor has had a broader influence in the twentieth century than he ever had in his own time. This book, published on the tercentenary of Edwards’s birth, makes an important contribution to the study of this major American figure.

^[2] In this volume, Helm and Crisp have brought together a collection of essays dealing with ‘central theological and philosophical concerns in Edwards’s thought…that reflects the confluence of scholars working in both these tradition’ (ix). These essays are representative of the best in contemporary Edwardsian scholarship. Several of the authors have written books on Edwards and his thought, but all of them are established experts in their disciplines. In these ten essays, the authors demonstrate that ‘Edwards continues to be a thinker whom theologians and philosophers can fruitfully engage’ (xv).

^[3] Jonathan L. Kvanvig, in ‘Jonathan Edwards on Hell,’ critiques Edwards’s defense of the traditional view of hell as a place of eternal punishment of the wicked. In The Nature of True Virtue, Edwards argues that a truly virtuous person is ‘governed by a love for God and delight in his beauty’ (5). Anything less than true virtue is sin and since this sin is against an infinite God, it is deserving of infinite punishment. Edwards further defends this strong view of hell through his doctrine of continuous creation, arguing that there is an intimate dependence between God and the created order. Thus, ‘harm to the created order automatically constitutes an offense against the being on whom this order completely depends’ (9).

^[4] Although Kvanvig thinks that Edwards’s view of creation is not adequate as a claim that all sin is against God, it is suggestive of what he thinks is a ‘slightly weaker thesis that can be used to achieve the same metaphysical result’ (9), divine conservation of all creation. Since existence is a contingent property, that anything exists is due to God’s preservation. Thus, ‘on any reasonable measure…God must be granted the very highest status. So Edwards’s account and the refinements of it presented here provide a strong foundation for a defense of the strong view of hell’ (11). Yet, Kvanvig remains unconvinced ‘that the strong view of hell can be defended completely, even given this foundation’ (11).

^[5] Kvanvig’s essay demonstrates both the impenetrability of the doctrine of hell as well as a way of defending a strong view that is helpful even if not compelling. He also demonstrates the need for further work on Edwards’s doctrine of continuous creation, a significant factor in much of his theological formulation. Finally, that Edwards’s preaching and other pastoral ministry was marked by a conviction of the reality of hell means his thought can hardly be understood apart from this foundational doctrine.

^[6] William J. Wainwright also treats ‘Jonathan Edwards and the Doctrine of Hell.’ Through an examination of several sermons, Wainwright summarizes Edwards’s arguments that hell demonstrates God’s infinite opposition to sin. While admitting the plausibility of Edwards’s arguments, Wainwright proposes that annihilation of the wicked might adequately achieve the same end. Further, the traditional view of hell, in Edwards’s Calvinistic theological system, seems to result in a problem for divine justice. As Wainwright puts it, ‘Within the framework of the assumptions of classical Christian theism, the doctrine of hell implies that God has “hated” certain persons from eternity. (For if God is omniscient and his decrees immutable, then, if he utterly opposes and rejects the damned, there is no time at which he does not oppose and reject them.) This is a stumbling block and an offense’ (24).

^[7] All those who hold to the traditional view of hell struggle with these issues of God’s justice and mercy. That a merciful and loving God would condemn creatures eternally for sin is a horrible doctrine. That he would himself choose only some to be delivered from hell, as Edwards believed, raises the specter of injustice. Edwards’s preaching was marked by repeated pleas for his audience to repent and thereby to escape the coming eternal punishment. These messages have the intensity and urgency they do because Edwards believed that hell is a horrible place and that the wicked are headed there unless they repent. Wainwright concludes that Edwards’s positions on these issues are not essential to a Christian doctrine of hell. He is correct. However, understanding Edwards’s view of hell is essential to a proper understanding of his preaching.

^[8] In ‘Edwards on Free Will,’ Hugh J. McCann agues that Edwards’s defense of determinism, and his denial of libertarian free will, are not convincing, ‘simply because the ordinary concept of freedom – whether it captures what really goes on in human action or not – is in fact an Arminian one’ (27). His overview of Edwards’s argument in Freedom of the Will accurately summarizes Edwards’s criticism of an Arminian view of freedom, and shows why Edwards finds this ‘ordinary concept of freedom’ inadequate.

^[9] McCann thinks that Edwards’s definition of freedom is ‘on the wrong track’ (40). He proposes that ‘human choice and volition, though exempt from natural causation, are nevertheless a product of God’s sovereign will as creator. That is, we may hold that God creates us doing the things we do, that the operation of our wills are simply part of what God himself wills in providing for our existence’ (40). Thus, ‘the existence of our actions is explained in the same way as that of the world is. They owe their being to the creative fiat of God, whose sovereignty and omniscience are accordingly complete, and who is able to guide the entire course of history with the loving providence believers usually take to rule our destiny’ (42). In the end, this position seems to be essentially not unlike Edwards’s own deterministic one.

^[10] McCann concludes with an important admission that any view which recognizes God’s exhaustive knowledge and comprehensive providence has the problem that God is in some way responsible for whatever happens in his world. In short, ‘we might wonder how God could ever will that we make decisions which violate the moral law, and especially how he could will the existence of anyone who is lost – assuming, that is, that some are. That is a deep problem, but it is not a new one. Edwards, in particular, would have to face it in any case, as would any other author who believes that in creating the world, God knows what he is doing’ (42). Edwards does, in fact, address the problem head on and he also points out that his Arminian adversaries have the same problem, since they too hold that God’s knowledge is comprehensive. He does not resolve the tension nor has anyone since him done an adequate job of solving this problem. It seems unlikely that any finite being ever will.

^[11] Paul Helm, in ‘A Forensic Dilemma: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Personal Identity,’ shows how Edwards adapted Locke’s view of simple ideas as a model for what happens to the believer in conversion. According to Helm, Edwards defined conversion as ‘the giving of a new simple idea, a new source of information and an insight into the nature of things denied to those who had to rely merely on the simple ideas provided by the operation of the five senses’ (45).

^[12] This essay is a nicely nuanced treatment of the relationship between Locke and Edwards. Edwards clearly read Locke and appreciated and appropriated some of his ideas. For some mid-twentieth century Edwardsian scholars, Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers were seen as heavily determinative of his theology, perhaps even more so than Calvin and the Puritans. Helm’s evaluation appreciates the impact of Locke on Edwards without overstating the influence.

^[13] Worthy of additional reflection and research is Helm’s discussion of the implication of Edwards’s view of continuous creation for the doctrine of original sin. Helm concludes the essay with the provocative statement: ‘One element of his philosophical theology, the idea of divine immediacy and of successive re-creation of the creation is, as far as I can see, fundamentally at odds with another, his great Christian doctrine of original sin’ (58). Since Edwards, in Original Sin, seems to argue that continuous creation defends the justice of God in the doctrine of original sin, this claim could be developed a bit more.

^[14] Oliver D. Crisp discusses Edwards’s doctrine of creation and conservation in ‘How “Occasional” was Edwards’s Occasionalism?’ Crisp argues that although Edwards does affirm belief in continuous creation in Original Sin, he goes further to endorse occasionalism. The distinction, Crisp explains, is that ‘the doctrine of continuous creation does not commit its defender to the additional claim (made by occasionalists) that there can be no secondary causes (because, say occasionalists, God is the sole cause of all things, and all mundane causation is merely the occasion of God’s activity…)’ (64). He concludes that Edwards was not simply an occasional occasionalist, but that he ‘was, indeed, a defender of occasionalism’ (75).

^[15] One of the most difficult of Edwards’s works is his The Nature of True Virtue, where he argues that the nature or essence of true virtue is, in simple terms, love for God for his own sake. Philip L. Quinn summarizes the intricate argument of this complex work in ‘The Master Argument of The Nature of True Virtue.’ This essay should be required reading for any student of Edwards, whether one’s interest is in his theology or philosophy.

^[16] The influence of Sang Hyun Lee on Edwardsian studies is evaluated in Stephen R. Holmes, ‘Does Jonathan Edwards Use a Dispositional Ontology? A Response to Sang Hyun Lee.’ Holmes acknowledges that Lee’s perspective has ‘become a standard interpretation of Edwards…[and] generally accepted by most readers’ (99). Lee argues that Edwards developed a novel ontology, ‘“a strikingly modern conception of reality as a dynamic network of dispositional forces and habits”’ (99; quotation from Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988], 4). Holmes’ fundamental problem with Lee’s position’ is that he finds it ‘very difficult to believe in. This is not for any straightforward philosophical or theological reason – as far as I can see, Lee’s picture is a coherent one, and it does not make any claims which can be dismissed as ridiculous in the present theological climate. It is, rather, for reasons of history: I cannot imagine Edwards, with the theological commitments he held to, coming up with anything like the doctrines that Lee tells us were at the heart of his system’ (100). Holmes further criticizes Lee for not understanding the theological and historical context of Edwards’s writings, for treating the text of Edwards’s writings as if they were written in the twentieth rather than the eighteenth century. In short, according to Holmes, Lee’s reading of Edwards is anachronistic. Holmes concludes, ‘For all the (many) merits of Lee’s work it is simply mistaken in its main thesis. Jonathan Edwards did not need a dispositional ontology, and he did not use a dispositional ontology’ (110).

^[17] This is an important essay and I think Holmes is right on target. Like some other Edwardsian scholars, Lee seems to read Edwards as a modern (or postmodern) man, far ahead of his own time. Edwards was an eighteenth century pastor, and was deeply immersed in his theological heritage. Edwards’s contribution was not generally the development of new or novel perspectives. Rather, Edwards was a gifted synthesizer, systematician, and popular communicator of the tradition. Of course, Edwards’s thought was not always identical to his heritage on every point. He was sometimes innovative, but not on this point and not to this degree.

^[18] Amy Plantinga Pauw, in ‘“One Alone Cannot be Excellent”: Edwards on Divine Simplicity,’ discusses an early statement by Edwards in his ‘Miscellanies’ notebooks. When he was only twenty years old, Edwards wrote, ‘one alone cannot be excellent, inasmuch as, in such case, there can be no consent. Therefore, if God is excellent, there must be plurality in God; otherwise, there can be no consent in him’ (115). This conviction, Pauw argues, remained central to Edwards’s thought ‘throughout his life, nourishing his reflections on the Trinity and funding his mature writings on religious affections, true virtue and God’s end in creation’ (115). In this view, Edwards departed from a tradition which ‘linked maximal unity with maximal existence’ (115).

^[19] Pauw seems to understand Edwards correctly. Compelling evidence for her thesis is found in another central Edwardsian motif, beauty. Pauw argues that, for Edwards, ‘Beauty thus requires ontological complexity. Within the divine simplicity tradition, complexity was a mark of creaturely limitation. Edwards practically reversed this, finding creaturely limitation reflected in the incapacity for complexity’ (122).

^[20] Further significant for Edwardsian studies is that Pauw has provided another example of how consistent and integrated Edwards’s thought was. His early commitment to complexity in unity, contra simplicity, marked his entire ministerial career. And that this insight impacted not only his view of the Godhead, but aesthetics, spirituality, ethics, and other disciplines is also telling. Edwards seems to have been particularly skilled at systematizing, synthesizing, and integrating previously disconnected ideas and concepts.

^[21] Gerald R. McDermott, ‘Jonathan Edwards, John Henry Newman and Non-Christian Religions,’ compares the nineteenth century Newman’s views on world religions to the eighteenth century Edwards’s. According to McDermott, Edwards’s interest in other religions seems to have grown during his life. Edwards’s typological view of divine revelation, which he applied not simply to the biblical text but to nature and history, meant that he saw types of the divine, particularly the person and work of Christ, ‘wherever the eye can see and ear can hear’ (128). In Edwards’s view, these types were also revealed in the history of humanity and in false religions. Thus knowledge of God was available by revelation to those outside the Christian faith. But is such revelation sufficient for salvation? In short, can those outside Christianity find salvation in their non-Christian religions? Although Edwards seems to have entertained the possibility of salvation through a ‘dispositional soteriology,’ McDermott acknowledges that ‘Edwards rarely allowed more than the possibility of salvation for the heathen’ (130). Newman goes far beyond Edwards in viewing pagan superstition more positively, seeing more constructive influence of other religions on Christianity, and considering more positively the possibility of salvation in non-Christian religions, but they both ‘were similarly intrigued by religious pluralism and gave considerable and sophisticated attention to it’ (135).

^[22] Particularly helpful about McDermott’s work is that he has shown how broad and pervasive typology was in Edwards’s theology. Edwards expanded the traditional application of typology to the recognition of types of Christ in the Old Testament to seeing types of Christ in history, nature, science, philosophy, and even in non-Christian religions. Thus, in Edwards’s view, God has revealed himself throughout all creation and all people have had evidence of the existence of the true God. Such revelation can be understood on some level by the unregenerate, but those indwelt by the Spirit are enabled to learn to understand the language of typology more fully. But the limited understanding of God available to the unregenerate is insufficient for salvation. For Edwards, salvation comes through faith in Christ, although he did admit the possibility of salvation of some who had never heard, such as infants.

^[23] Edwards, thus, provides motivation for studying and engaging in dialog with adherents of other religions. Such dialog is not simply to discover common ground for presentation of the Christian gospel, but, if God has revealed himself in types in other religions, Christians might pursue such study in order to understand the true God. Since those who have the Spirit can understand the language of typology, Christians could be able to explain to the non-Christians how their own religious beliefs point to the truth of Christianity.

^[24] In the final essay, Michael J. McClymond discusses ‘Salvation as Divinization: Jonathan Edwards, Gregory Palamas and the Theological Uses of Neoplatonism.’ McClymond argues for ‘a wide area of overlap between Edwards’s teaching on salvation and the Orthodox doctrine of divinization,’ as seen in the writings of St Gregory Palamas (1296–1459), ‘the definitive Orthodox writer on the subject of divinization’ (141). He concludes that this similarity might ‘serve as a stimulus for revisiting the question of Orthodox-Reformed relations’ (155). At the very least, dialog between these two Christian traditions might lead to better understanding of each other and of the God both desire to know and serve.

^[25] The editors assert that their intention was to contribute to Edwardsian studies by producing ‘one volume where central theological and philosophical concerns in Edwards’s thought have been brought together in a way that reflects the confluence of scholars working in both these traditions’ (ix). They have been successful. Although there might be other topics they could have included, such as Edwards’s biblical hermeneutics and theological methodology, it would be hard to argue that any of the subjects included should have been deleted. The doctrines of hell, free will, conversion, creation, the nature of God, virtue, and salvation are not simply important to Edwards and students of his thought. These are central topics for an understanding of his contribution to his day and ours. These essays both summarize current thinking on these issues, placing them in their theological and philosophical context, as well as providing framework for further study. In particular, Edwards’s doctrine of continuous creation (and occasionalism), the nature of conversion (the new way of seeing), his virtue ethics (and the implication for worship and ministry), his view of the Trinity (both the economic and immanent), divine revelation (including typology), and his view of world religions (with implications for both divine revelation and evangelism) are all worthy of further evaluation. That philosophers and theologians might continue to engage in this task together is an exciting proposition.